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The financial crisis that engulfed much of East Asia in the latter part of 1997 had 
more than just an economic impact. Even as the region experiences a 
continuing, if patchy recovery, it has become apparent that some of the most 
enduring consequences of the crisis have been political. In the short term this 
was manifest in a series of political crises and - in some cases – regime 
changes across the region. In the longer term, however, the crisis has 
highlighted continuing differences of opinion about the most appropriate ways of 
organizing economic activity in the region, and about the relationship between 
politics and economics more generally. At the center of this unfolding debate 
are some of the most influential sources of policy advice, the so-called 
international financial institutions (IFIs), which have become elements in an 
emerging form of transnational governance. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, (ADB), and even the 
World Trade Organization,1 have promoted a consistent, ‘neoliberal’ or market-
centered array of policy initiatives that are intended to fundamentally 
reconfigure the political-economies of East Asia and which pose a major 
challenge to existing modes of governance in the region (see Beeson 2002a). 
 
That the IFIs have been conduits for neoliberal reform may be considered 
unremarkable. And yet, when it is remembered that in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis there were widespread calls for the reform of the ‘international 
financial architecture’,2 which was considered to have played a key role in 
precipitating the crisis itself (see Arestis and Glickman 2002; Wade and 
Veneroso 1998), then the continuing dominance of neoliberal ideas in the IFIs 
is, perhaps, more surprising. At the very least, the influential position the IFIs 
have assumed as dispensers of authoritative advice on economic management 
- advice that is frequently supported by potential sanctions - merits further 
scrutiny. This paper examines the interaction between the IFIs and the broadly 
conceived East Asian region, paying particular attention to the role of the 
                                                 
1 Significantly, the WTO has expanded its ambit to include investment issues that promote 
financial openness and liberalization. The implications of such initiatives can be seen in the 
case of China which is being forced to drastically modify its existing legal system, something 
that looks likely to entrench the influence of a finance sector-dominated form of neoliberal 
capitalism. See Potter (2001). 
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2 See, for example G7 Finance Ministers (1998); Kahler (1998); IFIAC (2000). 
international financial system. It is argued that the close connections between 
the United States, the IFIs and the controllers of mobile capital continue to 
underpin a pro-liberalization agenda across East Asia and other parts of the 
world, despite compelling evidence about the potential disadvantages of such 
reforms. 
 
Consequently, I initially sketch the new patterns of international governance of 
which the IFIs are such a prominent part and which the US has had such a 
leading role in constructing and maintaining. Secondly, I outline the growing 
importance of financial capital at both an economic and political level. Next, I 
examine the existent financial structures in East Asia, before considering the 
impact of financial liberalization and its role in the crisis. Finally, I consider the 
position of the IFIs in the wake of the crisis itself and debates about the 
appropriate role of the IFIs themselves. An exploration of the role of the IFIs in 
the region and their advocacy of further capital liberalization not only helps us to 
understand the way the contemporary international political economy is 
governed, but it also suggests that if a more stable and sustainable international 
order that reflects both the interests of ‘East Asia’ and ‘the West’ is to be 
constructed, then the IFIs themselves may also need to be subjected to 
reformist pressures. 
 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, THE IFIS, AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
 
To understand both the way the financial crisis in East Asia occurred and the 
role played by the IFIs in its aftermath, we need to situate them in the context of 
the wider international political economy within which these events unfolded. 
Although there is no intention of providing a detailed analysis of the crisis itself 
here (see Beeson and Robison 2000), it is important to sketch briefly a number 
of key structural changes in the international economic system which were 
directly involved in the economic turmoil that affected the region, and which 
continue to play a major role in East Asia. Significantly, and despite the fact that 
a key element of the new international economic order – mobile financial capital 
– was both deeply implicated in the crisis itself and is potentially inimical to 
existent patterns of financial intermediation in the region, a policy of further 
financial liberalization enjoys the continuing support of the IFIs. Before 
considering why financial capital has become such a prominent force in the 
international system, it is necessary to explain why the IFIs’ advocacy of further 
financial liberalization carries such weight. 
 
International governance 
 
One of the most striking characteristics of the contemporary international 
system is the growing importance of non-state actors and the inclusion of such 
actors in new modes of international governance. While there is a lively and 
contentious debate in the scholarly literature about just how far this trend has 
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gone, and just what its long-term implications for the state may be,3 it is 
possible to make a few general claims about the way the international system 
works that are of central importance for this paper. 
 
The first point to emphasize, and the key to explaining the growing influence of 
the IFIs, is that in an increasingly integrated and transnational economic system 
there is a functional requirement for greater international cooperation and 
coordination (Cerny 1995). This is not to suggest that the precise structure of 
the international system is in some way inevitably determined by either the 
‘needs’ of mobile capital or the transnational corporations that dominate and 
organize much international commerce. On the contrary, the environment within 
which capital has become more mobile and some firms have become more 
globally oriented is a politically constructed one that both encourages and is 
driven by the evolution of the international economic system itself. One of the 
most striking things about the post-war international order that emerged in 
conjunction with, and as a consequence of, American hegemony is that the 
present system bears the imprint of the dominant power itself and of its liberal 
values (Latham 1997). Crucially, however, the contemporary system that had its 
origins in the post-war Bretton Woods system was one that was increasingly 
dependent on the activities a new array of inter-governmental agencies like the 
IMF and the World Bank.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II the role of the newly created IFIs 
was very different to the one they play today. In conjunction with the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the IMF and the Bank were primarily 
concerned with creating a stable, managed international order that encouraged 
greater interdependence and openness (Eichengreeen and Kenen 1994). The 
escalating Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union added greater 
urgency to the task of making capitalism work more effectively. Significantly, 
however, while the architects of the Bretton Woods institutions were keen to 
construct a liberal trading order, they wished to maintain much tighter control of 
financial capital, the pre-war activities of which were seen as deeply implicated 
in precipitating the inter-war Depression (Guttman 1994). A number of aspects 
of this original Bretton Woods order have changed in ways that merit emphasis 
as they help to explain both the continuing recurrence of financial crises and the 
growing importance of the IFIs and a number of other non-state agencies and 
actors. 
 
The collapse of the system of managed exchange rates associated with the 
Bretton Woods system has had a profound long-term impact on the 
international system.4 The major impact of a shift to market-determined 
                                                 
3 Much of this debate is subsumed under the general rubric of the ‘globalization’ phenomenon, a 
concept that has generated a vast secondary literature. For useful overviews see Held et al 
(1999) and Clarke (1999). 
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4 A comprehensive discussion of the end of the Bretton Woods system is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but see Block (1977) and Gowa (1983). 
currency valuations, greater freedom of capital movement, and a general 
diminution of governmental regulation of financial sector activities has been a 
massive expansion in the scale and scope of financial markets themselves 
(O’Brien 1992). Before considering this development in any detail, it is important 
to emphasize that this has led to a shift in the balance of power between 
broadly conceived state and market actors (Strange 1996), and to the 
simultaneous emergence of new centers of political and economic power. Such 
developments inevitably constrain the autonomy of national governments, 
especially in the smaller, non-core economies.5 Not only are many national 
economies simply dwarfed by the scale of international financial movements 
and consequently highly exposed to the unfavorable judgments of ‘the markets’, 
but the very basis of such judgments has changed in significant ways that 
further erode the autonomy of governments. The rise to prominence of 
international ratings agencies, for example, is perhaps the most compelling 
example of the way market actors are increasingly reliant on private sector 
organizations for ‘relevant’ information about potential investment locations 
(Sinclair 2001). 
 
The activities of the ratings agencies are emblematic of the new patterns of 
governance that characterize the contemporary order in which states are not 
the only – or in some cases – even the foremost determinants of the course and 
content of national development. At a general level, governance – understood 
here as the institutionally based organization of political and economic activities 
in pursuit of particular ends - has undergone an important transformation. No 
longer are governance activities associated exclusively with national 
jurisdictions. Increasingly, ‘global’ forms of governance are emerging in which 
the structuring of social activities includes both transnational and sub-national 
governance mechanisms (Rosenau 1995). Not only are a range of new, non-
state actors emerging to shape or control the regulatory regimes that govern 
economic activities in areas as diverse as intellectual property and securities 
markets (Cutler et al 1999), but they are helping to set the broader intellectual 
climate within which such activities occur. As Sinclair points out, one of the 
reasons that the ratings agencies exert such influence is that they help to 
transform the ‘mental infrastructure’ of the markets and encourage governments 
to anticipate what ratings agencies will deem to be ‘appropriate’ policy (Sinclair 
2001). 
 
Thus, the evolving realm of international governance involves a host of state, 
inter-governmental and non-state actors. States – or those in the core, at least - 
may still be the most powerful single actors in the international system, but they 
share their power in surprising and novel ways. The IFIs play an especially 
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5 World system theorists distinguish between the established ‘core’ industrialized economies of 
North America, Western Europe and Japan, and the ‘peripheral’ economies of the ‘developing 
world. While this formulation is somewhat rigid and fails to capture the subtlety of the East Asian 
experience, it does provide a broad brush indication of the ways different regions are structurally 
embedded in the international system. See Chase-Dunn (1998). 
crucial role in this regard as they help to construct an ideational framework 
within which particular policies are likely to be more favorably received by the 
controllers of mobile financial assets (Gill 1997). To see why such actors have 
become so powerful it is necessary to say something about the rise of financial 
capital and its possible implications for East Asia. 
 
The rise of financial capital 
 
One of the most important secular changes that flowed from the breakdown of 
the system of managed exchange rates associated with the Bretton Woods 
regime has been the remarkable growth in the scale of international financial 
capital. Indeed, for all the hyperbole and imprecision that often accompanies 
discussions of ‘globalization’, international finance has moved closer to the 
vision of a deeply integrated, highly mobile and unambiguously transnational 
system than any other sector of economic activity (Cohen 1996). Despite this, 
financial capital ultimately relies on the sort of predictable, rules-based 
international order that only states and inter-governmental organizations can 
guarantee. As we shall see, however, some states are far more influential in the 
construction of such regimes than others, a situation that has potentially 
profound implications for those countries that must adjust to an overarching 
international order – especially where it threatens existent domestic economic 
and regulatory relationships. 
 
Financial capital has always been an important element of capitalist economies 
(Arrighi 1994), but its relative influence and autonomy has been subject to 
political constraints. The rise and fall of financial sector interests during the 
inter-war period demonstrates that there is nothing inevitable or permanent 
about the political influence or dominance of financial capital (see Helleiner 
1993). Significantly, the original Bretton Woods agreement was intentionally 
designed to curb both the political influence of financial interests and the 
mobility of money, as they were held to be partially responsible for the Great 
Depression. Another political decision – the United States decision to abandon 
the system of managed exchange rates that was so central to the Bretton 
Woods system - brought about another fundamental transformation of the 
international monetary system and paved the way for the re-emergence of 
financial power (see Gowa 1983). 
 
The accumulation of foreign currency holdings – especially dollars – by 
European banks and the subsequent abandonment of a system of fixed 
exchange rates, created the preconditions for the expansion and heightened 
mobility of international finance.6 In retrospect, the evolution of the 
Eurocurrency markets is perhaps most significant, as Germain (1997: 92) notes, 
as symptomatic of the continuing shift ‘from a quasi-public to a more fully 
private monetary order’. Put differently, the evolution and transformation of the 
original Bretton Woods system consolidated the influence of the private sector 
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6 For a more detailed discussion of this period, see Strange (1994). 
generally and the interests of financial capital in particular. Even though pivotal 
actors like the US were complicit in this transfer of responsibility and authority to 
the private sector, such developments necessarily diminished the influence of 
states in general, especially those with little capacity to influence the structure 
or regulation of the international economic system.7 
 
Not only did this pattern of increased private sector influence across an array of 
important areas of transnational economic regulation consolidate over last three 
decades of the twentieth century (see Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Underhill 
1997), but the growth of the financial sector in particular gave mobile capital 
unprecedented potential leverage in relation to sovereign states. While 
international capital flows can take a number of forms – foreign direct 
investment, international bank lending, bond and equity purchases, foreign 
currency transactions, new derivatives and swaps instruments, or portfolio 
investments - the key point to emphasize about all of these types of capital is 
that they have expanded at a remarkable rate. The international banking sector 
as a percentage of world output grew from a negligible 1.2% in 1964, to 37% in 
1991. Foreign exchange markets have grown even more spectacularly of all, 
achieving a turnover of around US$1.5 trillion per day by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century (Held et al 1999: 189-235). To put this in perspective, the 
annual GDP of Indonesia – the most badly affected of the Southeast Asian 
crisis countries – is around US$141 billion.8 This merits emphasis for two 
reasons: first, smaller economic entities like ‘Indonesia’ are simply dwarfed by 
the scale of global financial markets; second, developing economies have been 
increasingly integrated into the circuits of global financial capital. True, most 
flows of capital (and trade, for that matter) remain centered on the dominant 
developed economies of Western Europe, North America and Japan, but other 
‘emerging markets’ have been progressively incorporated into an increasingly 
pervasive ‘international financial architecture’. Significantly, the type of capital 
flows to developing economies have steadily shifted over the last 30 or 40 years 
from ‘official finance’ to private loans, direct investment by multinational 
corporations, and increasingly large-scale - and mobile – portfolio investment 
(McCulloch and Petri 1998; Held et al 1999: 211).  
 
At one level, the growth of financial markets has clearly been facilitated by the 
development of reliable communications systems and remarkable 
improvements in the capacity of new computers (Cerny 1994). At another level, 
a major structural link has consolidated between the huge institutional investors 
that have risen to prominence in the developed world and the emerging market 
economies. Investment banks and mutual funds must restlessly seek out new 
sources of profitability to maintain their share of what has become a highly 
completive industry (The Economist 1997). Even a small share of the estimated 
                                                 
7 For a more consideration of the structurally embedded inequalities and difficulties confronting 
‘peripheral’ states, see Beeson and Bell (forthcoming). 
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8 See, APEC, Economic Indicators for APEC Member Economies, available at: 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/member/econ_indi.html 
US 4 trillion held by US mutual funds alone, can have potentially significant 
impacts on smaller developing economies, which have a limited capacity to 
productively absorb major capital inflows. Yet it needs to be re-emphasized that 
neither of these underlying structural preconditions – technological innovation 
and capital accumulation - would have been as significant had it not been for 
the continuing willingness of the world’s more powerful states to facilitate the 
growth and mobility of the financial sector with appropriate political initiatives. 
Although influential states like the US may have been willing participants in this 
process, the net effect has been to consolidate the influence and autonomy of 
controllers of mobile financial assets. As Cohen (1998: 132) notes, ‘for societal 
actors who can take advantage of opportunities afforded by market integration, 
capital mobility means more degrees of freedom – more room for maneuver in 
response to the actual or potential decisions of government’. 
 
The controllers of mobile financial assets, therefore, find themselves doubly 
advantaged. On the one hand they are the principal beneficiaries of a regulatory 
regime that enhances their flexibility and autonomy. On the other, they are 
becoming increasingly important components of the very regime from which 
they benefit. Not only has the emergence of a more market-centered, 
‘deregulated’9 environment seen financial capital play a greater role in either 
directly (through participation in regulatory mechanisms) or indirectly (through 
market power) shaping the international environment within which capital 
movements occur, but even those agencies which have formal and supposedly 
independent responsibility for such maters are generally seen as actively 
supportive of financial sector interests.  
 
The possible significance of changes in the overall regulatory environment 
within which financial capital operates can be seen in the metamorphosis of the 
IMF, which has mirrored and driven changes in the international financial 
system. Whereas the IMF originally had responsibility for overseeing the 
operation of a managed system of exchange rates, following the demise of the 
Bretton Woods regime it is now an active champion of greater financial 
liberalization, especially in the developing world. Significantly, the IMF’s 
evolving agenda continues to reflect the interests and policy goals of its most 
powerful members, especially the US (Pauly 1997). In turn, US policy is 
increasingly influenced by Wall Street generally and the controllers of mobile 
financial assets in particular (Henwood 1997). Although the Asian crisis 
triggered some internal debate within the IMF, as we shall see in more detail 
below, continuing opposition on the part of the IMF and the US Treasury has 
stymied the development of a new financial architecture or regulatory regime 
that might limit or control financial flows (Cartapanis and Herland, 2002).  
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9 As noted earlier, capitalism depends on the implicit or explicit support of states. In such 
circumstances, it may be more accurate to talk of different forms of regulation that support more 
mobile or liberalized forms of economic, activity; see Cerny (1991). 
That powerful financial institutions would seek to lobby for greater international 
financial deregulation is hardly surprising; as Bhagwati (1998: 11) points out, 
‘they have obvious self-interest in a world of free capital mobility since it only 
enlarges the arena in which to make money’. What is of greatest significance 
here is that this confluence of economic, political and institutional power that 
revolves around American-based financial has exerted an which the financial 
sector has traditionally operated in much of East Asia. As we shall see, the 
liberalization agenda promoted by powerful, predominantly Anglo-American 
states has major transformative implications for the way capitalism has hitherto 
been organised in the region. 
 
EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM AND FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
 
East Asia provides a particularly illuminating space within which to consider the 
impact of changes in the operation and regulation of global finance for two 
reasons. First, in the post-war period much of East Asia has subscribed to a 
very different regulatory regime in which financial movements have been tightly 
controlled by ‘interventionist’ states. Second, the general international trend 
toward greater openness and liberalization, which has been actively promoted 
by the IFIs since the 1970s (Pauly 2000: 125-26), has potentially major 
implications for the region’s existent political and economic structures – a 
possibility that the crisis itself demonstrated with dramatic clarity. To appreciate 
the importance of the challenge greater financial liberalization posed for East 
Asia, the region’s distinctive political-economies need to be briefly placed in 
historical and comparative perspective. 
 
East Asian capitalism 
 
East Asia is plainly a highly diverse region with a remarkable array of political 
and economic systems, to say nothing of cultural values and social practices. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of factors, especially pertaining to the 
region’s economic development, which make qualified generalization possible 
and meaningful, especially in comparison to alternative ‘Anglo-American’ forms 
of economic organization.10  
 
East Asia’s incorporation into an emerging world-wide capitalist order that was 
already dominated by the European powers meant that the region’s ‘late’ 
development would inevitably be different from, and to some extent shaped by, 
the existent international economic order.11 As the first and most spectacularly 
successful of the East Asian economies to industrialize and ‘catch up’ with 
Europe and North America, Japan pioneered a number of strategies and 
                                                 
10 It needs to be acknowledged that this discussion operates at a high level of generality, but 
these sorts of broad comparative points are central to a burgeoning literature on different 
varieties of capitalist organization which highlights significant differences across nations and 
regions. See Coates (2000); Hall and Soskice, (2001). 
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11 On ‘late’ development, see Gerschenkron. (1966). 
practices that were highly influential throughout the region. Although, a detailed 
consideration of Japan’s economic development is not possible here,12 a few 
points are worth briefly emphasizing. First, the form of capitalism that developed 
in Japan looked very different from that found in the Anglo-American economies 
like Britain and America (see Coates 2000). Although the close, cooperative 
business-government relations that distinguish Japan and its regional acolytes 
like Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia may now be dismissed as 
‘cronyism’ in the wake of the East Asian crisis and Japan’s continuing economic 
problems, it is important to acknowledge that such relationships are considered 
to have been central components of the East Asian region’s remarkable 
economic transformation (Weiss and Hobson 1995). The second point to 
emphasize, which is especially germane to this discussion, is that Japan also 
developed a highly distinctive and influential approach to the regulation and 
provision of finance capital. 
 
One of the most important differences in the way capitalism is organized in 
Japan and America, and a continuing source of friction between the two, has 
been the role played by their respective financial sectors. Historically, the US 
has had capital markets that operate largely independently of government 
intervention, something that has tended to reinforce the distance between 
government and industry more generally. In Japan, by contrast, the government 
has traditionally dominated the allocation of credit to indigenous companies 
through powerful agencies like the Ministry of Finance (Zysman 1983). This 
system of ‘directed credit’ allowed officials to recycle Japan’s extensive savings 
through domestic financial institutions and provide cheap credit to targeted 
industries in the expectation that they would contribute to the general 
development of the national economy. The efficacy of this route to accelerated 
industrialization and development was not only recognized by other countries in 
the region which adopted similar policies, but even the World Bank (1993) in its 
seminal report on the ‘East Asian Miracle’ acknowledged the role played by 
directed credit and financial repression.13 Financial repression – in which 
interest rates are deliberately kept below market clearing levels – was of central 
importance in the rapid development of Japanese companies, and often seen 
as a source of competitive advantage over their American rivals (Murphy1997: 
77-79).  
 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, this led to intense external pressure on the Japanese 
government - especially from the US (Moran 1991)14 - to liberalize its financial 
sector. Consequently, the highly regulated system, and the ‘unusual fusion 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed consideration see Tabb (1995). 
13 It should also be noted, however, that this recognition was grudging, ambivalent and the 
subject of intense debate between the Japanese who paid for the report and hoped it would 
vindicate their approach, and opponents in the Bank and the US who wished to see a 
continuation of the market-centered orthodoxy (see Wade, 1996). 
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14 It should also be noted that there were also powerful domestic forces associated with 
financial capital in Japan that were also encouraging liberalization. See Lapavitsas (1997). 
between financial and productive capital’ that distinguished the Japanese 
economy in its heyday has been significantly undermined (Leyshon 1994: 123). 
 
A couple of points about the Japanese system are worth emphasizing. First, the 
wider social accommodation of which the system of regulated finance was such 
an integral part has also begun to unravel. Japanese firms in the ‘real’ economy 
are less closely tied to, and reliant upon, particular banks than they once 
were.15 Second, and more seriously, the banks themselves, as a direct 
consequence of the liberalization of the financial sector, have accumulated 
massive liabilities as a result of the reckless lending they undertook in the new 
deregulated and highly competitive environment.16 Yet despite the difficulties 
currently facing the banking sector, its increased integration into the wider 
external economy has given it greater autonomy and brought about a 
fundamental change in the balance of power between the state and financial 
capital in particular (Calder 1997). Indeed, for all its problems, the Japanese 
banking sector, like its counterparts elsewhere, enjoys a degree of structural 
power that makes it simply too critical to the overall economic system to be 
allowed to fail. In short, the transition from a state-led financial sector to a 
market based model has been a traumatic process that has contributed to a 
more profound transformation of the post-war political, economic and social 
regime that accompanied Japan’s high growth era (Pempel 1998). 
 
If the embrace of financial deregulation has been difficult in Japan, the world’s 
second largest economy and a key international financial actor in its own right, it 
has been even more traumatic for some of Japan’s neighbors. 
 
The IFIs and financial liberalization 
 
The international fashion for open capital accounts and financial liberalization 
that had become the orthodoxy in the developed economies of North America 
and Western Europe during the 1980s, was followed in much of East Asia 
during the 1990s. While the potential benefits of large capital inflows in 
accelerating the development process may have been powerful incentives to 
pursue financial liberalization, there was often little recognition on the part of 
regional governments of the potential problems posed by large flows of highly 
mobile portfolio capital or short-term bank lending (Haggard 2000: 5). Not only 
were there limits to the capacity of the smaller Southeast Asian economies to 
productively absorb the massive inflows of capital that poured into the region in 
search of quick profits – something that caused asset bubbles and rampant 
speculation – but the potential mobility of the capital inflows left the economies 
                                                 
15 It should also be noted that many Japanese firms became increasingly preoccupied with 
financial engineering, rather than the production commodities during the bubble period – a 
situation that reflects the pervasive and potentially damaging influence of financial capital even 
in Japan; see Murphy (1997: 251-2). 
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16 Every estimate about the scale of Japan’s banking sector crisis and indebtedness exceeds 
the last. The latest estimates suggest a figure of ¥37 trillion, or 7% of GDP. The Economist, 
April 20th, 2002, Survey, p 3. 
of the region highly exposed to changes in investor sentiment. In retrospect, it is 
clear that a number of regional governments had become too reliant on short-
term capital inflows to bridge expanding current account deficits in the years 
before the crisis. When combined with what proved to be unsustainable 
currency pegs and unhedged foreign borrowings, then the preconditions for 
disaster were clearly in place (Jomo 2001). 
 
While there may be fairly widespread agreement about some of the triggers for 
the crisis, there is much less agreement about its longer-term significance or 
policy implications. For the IMF, which assumed responsibility for crisis 
management, the crisis was essentially homegrown and required ‘vast’ reforms 
as a consequence (Fischer 1998). The IMF was subsequently extensively 
criticized for the extent and content of the reforms it attempted to implement in 
Indonesia in particular, where its initiatives not only intensified the impact of the 
crisis, but sought to implement far-reaching political as well as economic 
reforms (Beeson 1998). The perception that the IMF bail-outs came with 
onerous conditions and were, in any case, ‘primarily for foreign banks rather 
than the East Asian economies or people’ caused widespread resentment 
throughout the region (Jomo 2001: 207). Significantly, even the IMF’s own 
research has subsequently acknowledged that not only were the ‘economic 
fundamentals’ of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia in relatively good shape 
before the crisis hit, but that the IMF’s standard crisis response may not have 
been appropriate for what was predominantly a problem caused by lenders and 
borrowers in the private sector, rather than governments (Boorman et al 2000). 
Following this recognition of the IMF’s own failures in crisis management, and 
the implicit acknowledgement that systemic factors had exacerbated the impact 
of the crisis, there have been some modest changes in the IMF’s policy 
orientation and more qualified support for continuing liberalization. The IMF now 
suggests that it, in cooperation with the World Bank,17 should assume greater 
surveillance of developing economies to identify domestic ‘weaknesses’ and 
thus ward off future crises. Yet even the IMF has been forced to concede that 
open capital accounts may not be an unqualified boon for smaller developing 
economies, and that Chilean-style restrictions on capital flows may be 
necessary to reduce vulnerability – even if full liberalization is still the ultimate 
goal (Fischer 2001). 
 
Given that two of the most unambiguous features of the crises in Southeast 
Asia were that the meltdown ‘followed close on the heels of programmes of far-
reaching financial liberalization’ (Arestis and Glickman 2002: 246), and that the 
crisis ‘without exception, spared those countries that had retained strong state 
direction of domestic and international financial institutions and flows’ (Grabel 
2002: 45), it might be supposed that a movement toward re-regulation, or at 
least a thorough re-examination of the merits of liberalization would be 
inevitable. While the IMF remains somewhat equivocal about policy direction 
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17 It should also be noted that the ADB takes a similarly pro-liberalization line of financial sector 
reform. See Lintjer (2001). 
after the crisis, others are less so. Indeed, an unexpected consequence of the 
crisis has been to highlight a major difference of opinion between the IMF and 
the World Bank (or its former chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, at least) over the 
most appropriate policy for the region. Stiglitz’s criticism of the over-zealous 
promotion of neoliberalism was predicated on the key insight that the 
construction of stable market economies had to be an incremental process 
which allowed time for supportive institutions to develop. In such circumstances, 
the East Asian crisis could be understood as arising from too little, rather than 
too much government intervention and oversight (Stiglitz 1999). While this 
repudiation of the neoliberal predilection for small, non-intrusive governments 
was remarkable enough, even more striking was Stiglitz’s criticism of both the 
IMF and the role of US-based financial capital, when he asked: 
 
…did America - and the IMF – push policies because we, or 
they, believed the policies would help East Asia or because we 
believed they would benefit financial interests in the United 
States and the advanced industrial world? (Stiglitz, 2000). 
 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Stiglitz’s observations were not were not well received 
at the IMF. The IMF’s close institutional allies at the US Treasury Department 
were instrumental in pressuring World Bank head James Wolfensohn to ‘rein in’ 
Stiglitz. Significantly, Stiglitz’s subsequent departure from the Bank was not an 
isolated incident. Another prominent Bank economist, Ravi Kanbur, also 
resigned when his iconoclastic report on the causes of poverty, which was 
critical of the impact of financial liberalization in the developing world, was 
rejected following Treasury and IMF objections (Wade 2001). Remarkably, 
therefore, despite doubts within the IFIs themselves about the efficacy of 
financial liberalization for developing countries with modest capacities to 
monitor or absorb major inflows of mobile capital, the overall thrust of IFIs policy 
advice remained largely unchanged. 
 
This is not to say that the IFIs message has not been significantly repackaged. 
One of the more interesting developments in the aftermath of the East Asian 
crisis has been the consolidation of the so-called ‘post Washington consensus’, 
in which the earlier, rather inflexible mantra of deregulation, liberalization, 
privatization and minimal government, has been supplemented by an emphasis 
on civil society, social capital and institutional development. Despite this 
acknowledgement of widespread dissatisfaction with the IFIs notoriously non-
inclusive, not to say imperious approach to their clients in particular, and issues 
of transnational governance more generally, little of substance appears to have 
changed. As Richard Higgott (2000a: 146) observes,  
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global policy debates…remain reliant on a set of 
“generalizable”, but essentially Western liberal, principles and 
policy prescriptions. Even while they offer a more subtle 
understanding of market dynamics than in the early years of 
neoliberalism, these prescriptions still demonstrate a penchant 
for universalizing notions of “one-size-fits-all convergence” on 
issues of policy reform under conditions of globalization. Such 
prescriptions may well be resisted in the developing world as 
but a new form of Western hegemony. 
 
That the initiatives and policies of the IFIs are likely to generate resentment was 
clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of the crisis (Higgott 2000b). Yet, 
resentment is one thing – effective ‘resistance’ or opposition to the dominant 
international order is quite another, as actors as varied as non-governmental 
critics of the IMF18 and the government of Malaysia have discovered (Beeson 
2000). Nevertheless, important initiatives have been undertaken or proposed in 
the region, which are designed to provide East Asia with a greater capacity to 
weather any future crisis and to enhance the region’s autonomy. An analysis of 
such initiatives tells us much about the nature of the IFIs influence on the region 
and the prospects for regional development.  
 
Post crisis reform in East Asia 
 
Predictably enough, the crisis generated a good deal of unaccustomed 
introspection in the East Asian region. The self-confidence, not to say hubris, 
that had accompanied the seemingly unstoppable rise of East Asia, was 
replaced by stinging external criticism and varying degrees of confusion, anger 
and resentment within the region itself. And yet, surprisingly quickly, a number 
of concrete proposals emerged from within East Asia about post-crisis policy 
coordination at the regional level and for the creation of mechanisms that might 
insulate the region against future crises.  
 
The first serious indigenous response to the East Asian crisis came from Japan 
in the shape of a proposed Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Significantly, Japan 
was to take the lead in organizing and – most importantly – financing a 
regionally-based fund with which to bail out the most badly affected of the crisis 
countries. Given that this proposal was developed remarkably rapidly in late 
1997, and might have actually warded off some of the more dire impacts of the 
subsequent crisis – especially the so-called ‘contagion effect’ in which regional 
economies fell like dominoes in the face of capital flight – the fact that it was 
stillborn is especially significant. Japan’s ambitious, long-overdue bid for 
regional leadership was fatally undermined by its ‘naive failing to underestimate 
the strength of opposition from the United States and the IMF’ (Higgott 2000b). 
The US was concerned that both its own influence and that of the IMF would be 
seriously undermined by Japan’s potentially far less demanding bail-out 
assistance, thereby depriving the US of a possibly unique opportunity to force 
financial and trade liberalization upon a part of the world that was notoriously 
unenthusiastic about such initiatives (see Jomo 1998 passim). Given Japan’s 
post-war history of subordination to the US and its reluctance to consider 
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18 Even opponents of the IMF have found that they need to operate on a discursive terrain 
demarcated by the IFIs if they are to have any influence at all. See O’Brien, R. et al (2000: 91).  
regional initiatives of which the US disapproved,19 its pusillanimous response is 
unsurprising. What is more surprising, perhaps, is that American opposition did 
not definitively extinguish the desire to establish more exclusively regional 
responses to the challenge global financial integration. 
 
Although the AMF was snuffed out, a number of other regional initiatives, 
especially the Manila Framework Group which brought together regional finance 
ministers to develop cooperative financial management strategies, and the ‘New 
Miyazawa Initiative’, which offered a $30 billion assistance package for crisis 
affected countries, kept the idea of an Asian-based financial response and crisis 
management strategy alive. Of potentially greatest long-term significance, 
however, was the so-called Chiang Mai Initiative, in which members of the 
putative ASEAN + 3 grouping agreed to develop a network of currency swap 
arrangements to avoid future currency crises in the region (Kawai et al 2001: 
46). Two – rather contradictory - points about this development merit emphasis.  
 
First, the increasing formalization and institutionalization of the ASEAN + 3 
grouping suggests that there is growing desire to consolidate the sort of 
exclusively Asian regional organization that seemed out of the question prior to 
the crisis. Of even more significance in the context of possible regional financial 
arrangements, however, is the fact that East Asian central banks – which 
include Japan and China/Hong Kong – together have foreign currency reserves 
in excess of US$800 billion, providing the essential preconditions for a more 
developed forms of monetary regionalism (Dieter 2000: 22-23). In other words, 
the economic prerequisites are in place to underpin a regional monetary regime 
should the governments of the region desire one.  
 
Yet despite some challenging, but not insurmountable, technical difficulties 
associated with fully instituting workable currency swap arrangements in a 
region where a number of governments suffer from a noteworthy lack of state 
capacity, the major obstacle to greater financial sector coordination appears to 
be political. Thus, the second point to make about the emerging regional 
financial arrangements is that they are compatible with, and explicitly 
acknowledge the continuing authority of, the IMF’s approach to the 
management of the region’s financial relations (Amyx unpublished). 
Significantly, as Ravenhill (2002: 192) points out, Japan, China and Korea have 
all expressed misgivings about the open-ended nature of their commitments to 
any regional currency swap mechanisms, something that might ‘not only [put] 
some of their reserves at risk but also their international credit ratings. 
Consequently, and despite the resentment the crisis engendered about the role 
of the IMF in particular, the governments of the region continue to encourage 
and acquiesce in the Fund’s role in monitoring regional financial arrangements. 
Consequently, both the role of the Fund, and by extension, the role of the US, 
remain largely undiminished in East Asia. 
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19 For a revealing illustration of Japan’s failure to support the development of East Asian 
organizational development in the face of US opposition, see Hook (1999). 
 
The continuing influence of the international financial sector 
 
That both the IMF and the international financial sector interests that they 
assiduously champion remain so influential is surprising given the increasing 
groundswell of opposition to the neoliberal orthodoxy of continuing financial 
sector liberalization they prescribe. Significantly, this more critical stance is not 
only coming from the usual suspects on the Left, NGOs, and those countries in 
East Asia and Latin America which have actually experienced recent financial 
sector induced crises. A number of recent scandals in the US and elsewhere 
have caused even prominent advocates of free markets and small governments 
to recognize the potentially negative impact that results from ‘a shared greed 
[that] nurtured a symbiotic relationship between Wall Street and company 
bosses’ (The Economist 2002: 21). There is increasingly widespread 
recognition that the financial sector has exerted an increasingly negative 
influence on the operations of companies in the ‘real’ economy. The collapse of 
first Enron and then WorldCom, the largest in American corporate history, are 
but the most spectacular example of a more generalized shift in the priorities of 
many companies which increasingly prioritize ‘financial engineering’, in an effort 
to bolster short-term profitability and thus the stock options of senior 
management (Blackburn 2001). The conspicuous failure of the private sector 
accountants and ratings agencies charged with regulatory oversight to prevent 
or predict such collapses has also raised questions about the new structures of 
governance that characterize contemporary capitalism. 
 
The rise of financial capital and its possible impact on the activities of firms in 
the real economy has a more immediate significance in the context of East 
Asia’s integration into an international system dominated by the US and IFIs, 
however. The generalized, international decline in the profitability of global 
manufacturing that gathered pace as a consequence of growing over-capacity 
and intensifying competition from the 1970s onwards (Brenner 1998), not only 
contributed to the overall rise and influence of financial capital in the 
international system, but it also heightened the significance of the relative 
competitive advantages of corporate entities in America and East Asia. The 
economies of East Asia, which had formerly utilized high domestic savings that 
provided ‘patient’ capital through national banking systems to local industry, 
were placed at a disadvantage: what had been a source of strength in a tightly 
regulated, relatively insulated system, rapidly became a potential source of 
vulnerability in a more open system of potential capital flight and market 
determined interest rates (Wade 1998). US companies, which raised capital 
primarily through stock markets rather than banks were less vulnerable to this 
long-term shift in the structure of the international system and the increased 
influence of financial capital (Dumenil and Levy 2001).  
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The potential competitive benefits that might accrue to US firms relative to their 
East Asian counterparts notwithstanding, there are two other compelling 
explanations for the continuing support for financial sector interests by the US 
government - despite their negative impact on the conduct of business in 
America, to say nothing of East Asia and Latin America. First, the existence of 
what Jagdish Bhagwati (1998: 12) called the ‘Wall-Street-Treasury complex’ is a 
powerful driving force in a process of continuing liberalization from which 
America’s major financial firms stand to be the principal beneficiaries. Although 
the financial sector in the US clearly has become a major economic and political 
influence, there is an even more compelling source of governmental support for 
financial sector interests that extends beyond this relatively narrow sectoral 
interest: the US’s wider economic and political interests are served by the 
continuing dominance of finance. On the one hand, ‘free capital movements 
…force other economies to adopt free market structures not only in finance but 
across the board’ (Wade and Venoroso 1998: 36) – something that has been a 
central objective of American foreign policy, especially in relation to East Asia . 
On the other hand, the US’s status as the world’s largest debtor nation, its 
continuing balance of payments problems, and the return of massive budget 
deficits in the wake of September 11th, mean that it remains highly dependent 
on the inflows of capital from the rest of the world to maintain consumption and 
investment – especially at a time when consumer spending is such a crucial 
component of fragile-looking domestic growth (The Economist May 4th, 2002: 
72).  
 
Consequently, and despite continuing reservations about the efficacy and 
benefits that flow from financial sector liberalization, especially for developing 
countries (Griffith-Jones and Kimmis 1999), there is little chance of fundamental 
reform – absent a major crisis that affects the US. Proposals for the reform of 
the ‘international financial architecture’, which were as prominent as calls for the 
reforms of ‘crony capitalism’ in the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis have 
been stymied because reformist initiatives  
 
had of necessity to run through a decision-making process 
controlled throughout by the United States. The menu of 
available options was an American menu, defined in 
accordance with American national and commercial interests’ 
(Germain 2001: 415). 
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That a hegemonic power would attempt to shape the international system to 
further what it perceives to be its national interests is unsurprising – this has, 
after all, been one of the historical characteristics and benefits of hegemony 
(Arrighi 1994). The US’s attempt to reshape post-crisis East Asia in its own 
image is but the latest manifestation of this pattern (Beeson 2002b). What is 
distinctive about contemporary hegemony, however, is that it is bound up with, 
and reliant upon, new patterns of transnational governance that themselves 
depend on the activities of international institutions. Much of the activity of the 
IFIs, central bankers and other financial officials who have assumed 
responsibility for managing the international financial system occurs in a non-
transparent, technocratic realm, that is unaccountable and non-democratic 
(Scholte 2002; Woods 2000). Given the nexus that exists between both 
financial sector interests and American policy-making on the one hand, and the 
US and the inaccessible, unaccountable IFIs on the other, the prospects for 
reform initiatives that take seriously the perspectives and interests of state and 
non-state actors outside this privileged inner circle are not bright (see 
Cartapanis and Herland 2002). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The political decisions which led to the abandonment the Bretton Woods system 
of managed exchange rates had profound consequences which continue to 
influence contemporary events. While much of East Asia may have benefited 
from the environment American hegemony created in the first few decades after 
World War II, the end of the Cold War and the rise of financial capital in a less 
tightly regulated, more integrated international system has presented major 
challenges for the region. On the one hand, the US has displayed an 
increasingly unilateral willingness to pursue its national interests freed of the 
Cold War’s strategic constraints. On the other, the liberal, finance-sector 
dominated international order that the US helped create, and which it directly 
and indirectly – through the IFIs – exerts a profound influence, inevitably 
constrains the options available to other states and actors. Whether it is the 
steady erosion that the liberalization of international finance is inevitably having 
on domestic regulatory and economic structures across parts of East Asia, or 
the more subtle impact the finance sector is having upon economic activity in 
the ‘real’ economy everywhere, the influence of financial capital is increasingly 
pervasive. 
 
It is not simply the ubiquitous presence and influence of the financial sector that 
is of concern, however. The key issue in the context of finance capital revolves 
around its increasingly destructive and destabilizing impacts. Whatever 
shortcomings East Asia may have had in terms of its governance structures 
before the crisis, there is widespread agreement that the punishment inflicted by 
the financial markets and the controllers of mobile capital was out of all 
proportion to the region’s ‘crimes’. Remarkably enough, however, and despite 
accumulating evidence that the negative impact of the international financial 
sector can afflict even those economies which apparently have most to gain 
from its activities, there has been little attempt to curb its influence or act to 
reduce the systemic risks its activities pose. Until other countries or regions 
outside of the US’s hegemonic orbit can either influence the agendas of existing 
IFIs or create alternatives through mechanisms like the nascent ASEAN + 3 
grouping, the risks associated with unregulated movements of financial capital 
are likely to continue outweighing any potential benefits. 
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